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The	crisis	trap:	Why	the	EU	must	not	sideline
democracy	as	it	tackles	coronavirus
The	Covid-19	crisis	calls	for	a	major	policy	response	from	European	governments,	but	should	we	be
cautious	about	where	these	actions	might	lead?	Jonathan	White	explains	that	while	crises	are
typically	when	the	need	for	action	can	seem	strongest,	it	is	exactly	in	such	moments	that	new
initiatives	should	be	viewed	with	caution,	since	the	means	and	the	ends	may	be	distorted.
“The	worst	defect	weak	republics	can	have	is	to	be	indecisive,	so	that	all	their	decisions	are	taken	out
of	necessity,	and	if	any	good	comes	to	them,	it	comes	through	force	of	circumstance	rather	than	through	their	own
prudence.”	Machiavelli’s	words	seem	especially	apposite	today,	as	governments	around	the	world	are	accused	of
dithering	before	the	coronavirus	threat.	Indecision	followed	by	hurried	adaptation	seems	the	rule.	In	Europe,	this
applies	not	just	to	national	governments	but	to	the	supranational	institutions	of	the	European	Union,	to	whom	many
have	looked	for	a	decisive	response	yet	whose	actions	can	still	seem	painfully	slow.
It	would	be	easy	to	blame	“failures	of	leadership”,	but	in	many	respects	the	problems	are	structural.	Power	in	the
EU	is	divided	across	many	hands,	and	supranational	authorities	can	only	do	so	much	without	the	backing	of	leading
member	states.	Even	in	the	case	of	economic	policy,	where	the	European	Central	Bank	and	EU	Commission	have
shown	a	willingness	to	deploy	significant	powers,	they	can	rarely	act	alone.	As	Machiavelli	also	noted,	republics
based	on	the	diffusion	of	power	across	multiple	sites	tended	to	work	in	“slow	motion”,	“since	no	council	nor	any
magistrate	can	undertake	anything	alone,	for	in	many	instances	they	need	to	consult	one	another,	and	…	time	is
wasted	in	coming	to	an	agreement.”
Leave	the	EU	out	of	it,	one	might	say	–	it	was	not	designed	to	deal	with	public	health	emergencies,	so	inertia	is	only
to	be	expected.	But	there	is	a	risk	in	such	contexts:	that	moving	too	slowly	leaves	EU	leaders	feeling	pressured	to
act	decisively	nonetheless,	ultimately	in	ways	that	are	hard	to	monitor	or	constrain.	There	have,	after	all,	been	many
calls	for	stronger	European-level	action	to	tackle	the	coronavirus.
One	of	the	striking	and	generally	welcome	features	of	this	crisis	so	far	has	been	the	widespread	enthusiasm	for
political	intervention.	This	translates	first	and	foremost	into	renewed	interest	in	state	planning,	but	it	is	combined
with	calls	for	stronger	cross-national	coordination	and	supranational,	even	global,	authority,	arguably	with	good
reason.
Yet	one	thing	we	have	learnt	from	more	than	a	decade	of	EU	crisis	politics	is	that,	when	leaders	are	moved	to	take
urgent	action	in	the	absence	of	existing	authority	structures,	power	tends	to	be	relocated	to	small	groups	and
exercised	informally	and	opaquely.	Since	EU	procedures	can	be	cumbersome	and	demanding,	unofficial	channels
tend	to	be	preferred.	After	the	most	recent	failure	of	the	European	Council	to	reach	agreement	on	a	common
response	to	the	economic	crisis,	this	task	was	transferred	to	the	“Eurogroup”,	not	a	formal	institution	but	the	name
given	to	a	gathering	of	Eurozone	finance	ministers.	As	in	the	euro	crisis	of	the	2010s,	its	uncodified	status	means
discretion	can	be	exercised	with	few	constraints.	EU	decision-making,	which	is	hard	to	scrutinise	at	the	best	of
times,	is	decidedly	more	so	in	times	of	emergency.
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EU	Foreign	Affairs	Ministers	discussing	the	Covid-19	pandemic	via	video	conference	on	3	April	2020,	Credit:	 European	Union
There	is	a	basic	conundrum	here.	On	the	one	hand,	crisis	moments	are	when	the	need	for	action	can	seem
strongest.	They	represent	opportunities	for	constitutional	overhaul,	since	there	is	typically	greater	will	to	innovate.
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	exactly	in	such	moments	that	new	initiatives	should	be	viewed	with	caution,	since	the
means	and	the	ends	may	be	distorted.	Actions	taken	of	necessity	in	extreme	situations	create	something	like	an
“original	sin”	–	they	are	marked	negatively	by	the	conditions	that	gave	rise	to	them.
When	the	Italian	prime	minister	Giuseppe	Conte	called	for	“extraordinary	and	exceptional	measures”	from	the	EU	to
deal	with	the	crisis,	it	was	not	difficult	to	concur.	Members	states	such	as	Italy,	France	and	Spain,	argue	plausibly
for	the	introduction	of	“eurobonds”	so	as	to	alleviate	the	burdens	of	state	debt,	a	measure	Germany,	the
Netherlands	and	others	have	so	far	resisted.
But	exceptionalist	logic	is	slippery.	It	can	be	used	to	attach	stringent	conditions	to	otherwise	desirable	measures,	as
with	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	the	financing	organ	created	during	the	last	Eurozone	crisis,	which
Germany	would	like	to	reuse	today.	It	can	be	used	to	sidestep	the	need	for	democratic	controls	–	proposals	for
eurobonds	tend	to	exclude	parliamentary	involvement	over	how	resources	are	used.
Emergency	logic	can	also	be	used	to	render	certain	measures	temporary	(e.g.	the	loosening	of	state	aid	rules	that
restrict	public	spending),	on	the	understanding	they	are	suited	only	to	exceptional	times,	as	well	as	to	render
temporary	measures	permanent	(e.g.	those	built	into	the	ESM	that	were	first	trialled	as	standalone	arrangements),
on	the	understanding	they	prevent	a	relapse.	Emergency	measures	are	aimed	at	solving	specific	problems:	how
they	relate	to	general	principles	is	always	ambiguous.
The	stakes	are	high,	which	is	why	what’s	discussed	behind	the	closed	doors	of	informal	forums,	such	as	the
Eurogroup,	matters.	It	matters	in	particular	because	supranational	institutions	tend	to	be	closely	tied	to	predefined
policy	goals	–	in	the	EU	case,	the	stability	of	the	Eurozone	and	the	single	market.
The	discretion	displayed	by	EU	officials	in	crisis	politics	tends	to	be	directed	primarily	at	reinforcing	these	things	–
logically	so,	given	their	mandate.	Improvised	decision-making	may	be	welcome	if	one	is	confident	of	the
representative	or	technocratic	capacity	of	institutions,	but	it	is	in	need	of	careful	scrutiny	if	predisposed	to	serve
certain	ends.	What	counts	as	an	emergency	ultimately	depends	on	what	parts	of	the	status	quo	one	wants	to
preserve:	these	issues	need	to	be	contested	in	the	open.
That	the	EU	must	be	redesigned	in	this	crisis	seems	clear,	but	these	are	also	the	moments	most	treacherous	for
redesign.	Fear	creates	a	desire	for	political	action	easily	abused	–	an	impulse	to	applaud	interventions	of	all	kinds
and	to	bemoan	their	absence.	It	creates	a	licence	for	new	powers	that	are	hard	to	control,	and	precedents	bad	as
well	as	good.
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Machiavelli’s	warning	was	clear:	“In	a	republic,	it	is	not	good	for	anything	to	happen	which	requires	governing	by
extraordinary	measures.	Although	extraordinary	measures	may	be	beneficial	at	a	certain	moment,	the	example
nevertheless	causes	harm,	because	if	one	establishes	the	habit	of	breaking	the	laws	for	good	reasons,	later	on,
under	the	same	pretext,	one	can	break	them	for	bad	reasons.”	Europeans	need	to	be	on	their	guard.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	the	New	Statesman.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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